Compassion: An East-West Comparison
ABSTRACT
Compassion is an emotion that occupies a central position in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy while it is often a neglected subject in contemporary western philosophy. This essay is a comparison between an Eastern view of compassion based upon Mahayana Buddhist perspectives and a western view of the same emotion. Certain principles found in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy such as the Bodhisattva Ideal, and suffering (dukkha) to name two, are explored for the information they contain about compassion. An essay by Lawrence Blum is taken as representative of a Western view (but not exclusively) and it is analyzed for its shortcomings in light of the Buddhist view. The conclusion briefly describes the value of understanding an eastern view on compassion as a means of filling the void one finds in western medical ethics discourse which focuses so heavily, and redundantly, upon issues such as patient autonomy and paternalism. A Chinese Ch'an Master once said: 'We are all in the path of enlightenment, but the question is, are we on the right track?' [1]
Compassion is an emotion that occupies a central position in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy while it is often neglected in contemporary western philosophy. Comparisons between Eastern and Western views on this emotion are rare if they exist at all. Yet, such a study would prove invaluable to the Western philosophical discipline of medical ethics. A study of this kind would require a much larger text of research than the one presently before you. However, one must begin somewhere and this essay is proposed as the beginning of what is hoped will be a much longer and much broader discourse which evaluates Eastern philosophical perspectives in terms of Western needs in medical ethics. This essay will not attempt any elaboration upon the idea just presented. Rather, it attempts to get at the root of some of the differences and difficulties one uncovers when engaging upon a more or less straight-forward comparative analysis of compassion from two culturally different views. You will find before you first, a short explanation of why emotions have been neglected. This is provided in order to prove the validity of the assertion made in the opening sentence of this essay. It also provides the reader with the insight that his or her own attitude towards emotions may well have a negative bias which results in a less open attitude to the ideas presented here. Having made this point the essay turns to an explanation of certain important principles of Mahayana Buddhism as they relate to compassion. However, the task of extracting information regarding an Eastern view based upon Mahayana Buddhism turns out to be a complex process. Many ideas about emotions are embedded in this philosophy as Padmasiri de Silva points out when he says: Some of the central dimensions of emotions which I have described as presented in the western philosophy of emotions can be accommodated within the Buddhist perspectives on emotions... These observations are found dispersed in the discourses of the Buddha... [2]
From among these discourses, then, concepts such as conventional reality (Samsara), suffering (duhkha), impermanence (anitya), the non-self (anatman) and the doctrine of the Two-fold Truth are discussed. And, the importance of meditation as the vehicle to enlightenment is highlighted. The outcome of this narrower focus is that certain arbitrary decisions have been made regarding what to include here. In my discussion about the nature of suffering as an inherent part of Being [3] I draw upon the Heideggerian model. In addition, considerable time is taken discussing the Bodhisattva Ideal as it applies here. [4,5] This is followed by a brief analysis of Lawrence Blum's essay on compassion which is taken as representative of a Western analytic perspective, but not exclusively. [6] Certain strengths and weaknesses of Blum's analysis are pointed out to show where one must be careful about being too analytical when examining the topic of compassion. Such an approach can result in a lack of depth that is one of the features of Blum's otherwise well-written essay.
In my conclusion, I briefly discuss the value of understanding this Eastern view on compassion since I believe aspects of it will help fill the void one finds in Western medical ethics discourse which focuses so heavily, and redundantly, upon issues such as patient autonomy, paternalism and informed consent. Lastly, although Mahayana Buddhism makes no formal claim to being an ethical theory, one cannot ignore the underlying ethical tone of many of its doctrines. Therefore, although ethics or moral theory is not the primary focus of this essay, in some way this is a discussion about morality.
The Insufficiency of Discourse on Emotions--Lack of Balance
Despite a common prejudice, reason and emotion are not natural antagonists. [7]
There is a noticeable absence of study about emotions in philosophy which is ascribed to a prejudice against them. They are viewed as being irrational and, therefore, undeserving of attention. In the West [8] such attitudes are routinely expressed in philosophical discourse. They have their foothold in the works of ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, and they have been consistently reiterated and reinforced by most major Western philosophers through the ages. During the 18th-century European Enlightenment, the tools for analytic philosophy were finely forged with a disproportionate emphasis upon, and valuing of, highly rational dichotomous thinking. The legacy of this history has been a relegation of emotions to the 'back room' of philosophy where they have been left to collect dust. In the meantime Western philosophers have engaged in a centuries-old myopic discussion of the virtues of reason. Over-emphasis upon reason has resulted in the creation of something like a 'straw man' where emotions are concerned. Often their only use has been to emphasise how useless they are.
The result is that many Western philosophers have failed to come to an understanding of the integral role emotions play in human behaviour, particularly moral behaviour. Padmasiri de Silva describes negativism towards emotions saying: ... they are considered antithetical to our cognitive skills, to think, reason, perceive and understand. Emotions have also been considered as states which interfere with the development of good character and as ethically undesirable states which ought to be eliminated. In the realm of human behaviour it is assumed that always emotions interfere with calm, voluntary and rational behaviour. [9]
The above description differs from the balancing of reason and emotions that is found in Mahayana Buddhism during certain period of its development. [10] Dayal indirectly addresses this balance in the Eastern view when he discusses 'The Ten Powers' and the 'Eighteen Avenika-dharmas' of the Buddha. The following quotation tells us that without the use of reason and intellect the Buddha would not have the mental power needed to fulfil his position. Dayal says: A Buddha possesses the knowledge of correct and faulty conclusions. He knows fully and truly the consequences of all actions in the past, present and the future with regard to their causes and circumstances. He is cognizant of the various aspirations and dispositions of different types of persons. [11]
This tells us that the Buddha is able to make sound judgments. He is able to anticipate the outcome of actions on the basis of logical deduction (or induction [12]). He then integrates this knowledge into a cause and effect analysis. All of these processes are the activities of reason. However, when Dayal says that the Buddha is 'cognizant of the various aspirations and dispositions of different types of persons' we interpret this to mean that the Buddha is aware that both aspirations and dispositions are based in emotions. This means that emotions, and knowledge of them, are of great importance to his functioning effectively. In another Dayal discussion about the 'Eighteen Avenika-dharmas', emotions are again emphasised. He says that a Buddha is distinguished from other beings by his deep and great pity, love, mercy and compassion for all beings (karuna). [13] Possession of these emotions is the mark that distinguishes a Buddha from ordinary people.
We see an incorporation of emotions into the Dharma [14] when we consider, for example, discussions of the five aggregates (khandha) which are regarded as comprising personhood. These aggregates are, (1) body (rupa); (2) feelings (vedana); (3) perceptions (sanna); (4) dispositions (sankhara) and (5) consciousness (vinnana). The five aggregates, representing conventional notions of personhood, [15] are then integrated into larger principles until one arrives at a single unified doctrine. A brief review of the Mahayana principles mentioned in the introduction of this essay follows; it will provide us with a clearer understanding of how closely mind (reason) and spirit (in part emotions) co-mingle in this holistic philosophy. The tools of reason such as language and logic are used to describe the significance of these principles in growth of the spirit.
These examples show that while reason is important in Mahayana Buddhism it does not rule disproportionately as it does in the West. In Buddhism, [16] de Silva says, 'an emotion can be described as an interactive complex emerging within a causal network'. This means that emotions like compassion are not normally subjected to Western style reductive analysis, and the devaluation that often accompanies such a process. This is not to say that there are not similarities between Eastern and Western views of compassion.
In both, distinctions are made between good and bad, positive and negative, active and passive emotions. Compassion is regarded as an active, positive emotion with volitional qualities in both cultures.
The Bodhisattva Ideal
According to Dayal the word 'Bodhisattva' designates an individual who is actively seeking to live a saintly life based upon the Buddha's life and Dharma. Bodhisattva is a Sanskrit word that has 'Bodhi' as its root meaning 'Enlightenment'. [17] 'Sattva' can mean both 'any living or sentient being' and 'a being of (or destined for) Enlightenment'. Taken as a whole this word exemplifies the belief that each person has the seed of Buddhahood within. Some time in the third century after the Buddha's death the ideal of the arhat, as a person who emulated the teaching of the Buddha and was free from worldly contamination, underwent a change. Monks, called arhats, began to ignore important aspects of fundamental Buddhist teachings. They became increasingly self-centred and ceased to be committed to zealous missionary work among the people. To counter this unwelcome change, the whole arhat ideal was challenged by a new one, the Bodhisattva doctrine, which promulgated the ideal of compassionate action. Its history is as follows:... bodhisattva doctrine was promulgated by some Buddhist leaders as a protest against lack of true spiritual fervor and altruism among the monks of that period, The coldness and aloofness of the arhats led to a movement in favor of the old gospel of 'saving all creatures'. The bodhisattva ideal can be understood only against this background of saintly and severe, but inactive and indolent monastic Order... [18]
This statement concludes by saying that it borders on blasphemy to think of a Buddha who is not loving and altruistic. The new Bodhisattva Ideal made the selflessness of compassion a requirement for the Bodhisattva. This requirement dictates that the Bodhisattva must sacrifice entering nirvana himself because to do otherwise would mean abandoning those suffering in samsara whom he must teach. His vow is to 'lead all being to Liberation.... 'staying in samsara'... till the end, even for the sake of one living soul'. [19] Statements such as this reveal the underlying ethics found in Mahayana Buddhism. In the Bodhisattva Ideal one comes to understand that suffering is not necessarily disclosed to those who suffer yet, nevertheless, exists. Suffering (duhkha) is the ground from which the Being of human beings arises. [20] It is a deeper suffering than the physical or emotional or psychological although these forms of suffering are symptomatic of this deeper affliction. Such suffering is a universal circumstance of all beings. In this essay it is called the primordial [21] nature of suffering as an affliction of all living human beings.
The Doctrines of Non-self and Two-fold Truth
Virtuous man, since the time without beginning all living beings have been thinking wrongly of the I and of the one loving the I. As they do not know that they are just the rise and fall of consecutive thought, they give rise to love and hate and indulge in the five desires; (arising from the objects of the five senses).[22]
Compassion is an emotion that is 'other' directed, it involves a concern for the well-being of others rather than our own. Thus, it moves us away from the ego-centric self towards the non-self. In developing compassion one comes to understand and acknowledge the interdependence of things upon each other (pratitya samutpada). We become enlightened to the fact that when we help others we help ourselves. We also recognise that the ego-centric assumptions we make about our own individuality and independence are falsely grounded in our cravings and desires. Gadjin Nagao tells us that:
It is a matter of course that in Buddhism defilements based upon ego-consciousness are to be removed. The aim of this removal.... is to elucidate... the dependent nature of the 'doer', 'goer' and so forth all of which are wrongly assumed to have independent and absolute existence. The subject that is freed from ego-consciousness and is of the other dependent nature can attain the perfect enlightenment. [23]
In Mahayana Buddhist doctrine we are called upon to free ourselves from the defilements of the samsaric world which arise because of our ego-consciousness. A central notion of the ego-centric person is that he is, in some way, the centre of the universe and that the things of this world are his. He sees himself as an independent ruler of his life and as a powerful person who has some control over the impermanence (anitya) of all things. Believing in his power he also believes that he has a right to ownership of the things of this world just as he clings to these very beliefs themselves. His attitude is concerned with the satisfaction of one's own desires without consideration, oft-times, of others. Such ego drive carries with it a profound misunderstanding of what it means to have Being in this world. Such is the sense in which we should understand Nagao's statement about how an ego-centric view 'wrongly' assumes that it has an 'independent and absolute existence' that is without attachment to others. In his wisdom the Buddha understands that this ego-centric view of the world is wrong; it is an artificial creation of our imagination which leads us away from the real truth of our interdependent natures. To be freed of these false pretences we must free ourselves of the 'self', the ego and its drives which sway our perspective. [24] Nagao explains:
Through our cognitions, or discriminations, or intellect, we are always projecting some kind of imagination (which is always false imagination from the Buddhist point of view) onto the world that is originally neutral. This projection of false imagination changes or contaminates the world. People become attached to this contaminated world, thinking that it is the real world. This attachment gives rise to all forms of human suffering, discontent, conflict, defilement and so on. [25]
Compassion, because it takes us away from our selves, is intimately linked to the ability to free ourselves from false assumptions and the elements of the samsaric world which we falsely perceive (ditthi [26]) as real.
Clarence Hamilton [27] describes how loss of ego-centredness into selfless compassion is an integral part of the Bodhisattva Ideal. He says of Bodhisattvas:
They do not become enervated by prosperity, and do not lose composure in adversity... They are unwearying in clothing the nakedness of others... they acquire the roots of virtue by keeping themselves aloof from passion, hatred and folly... They are skilled in bringing solace to those in trouble and misfortune. They do not hesitate to enter all kinds of service... They are free from sin... they love their enemies... [28]
The Doctrine of the Two-fold Truth is inextricably linked to the doctrine of the Non-self (anatman). This doctrine provides a way of explaining the relationship between samsara and nirvana, but it should not be taken simply as a literary device. Samsara is the material world of the everyday, it is the world into which we are born and then leave in death. [29] Samsara is filled with ignorance and suffering because our ego-centric view prevails in it. Its falsity is even expressed in words which, by their nature, set limits to our experience. Words describe our erroneous beliefs and, thus, perpetuate our ignorance of the true nature of Being. Nirvana, on the other hand, is the ideal world of enlightenment. It is free of ignorance and suffering. Yet, it is not a material world as samsara is. Rather, it is 'the ultimate goal of Buddhist striving, a suprapersonal and non-dual experience of voidness which is the end of all duhkha and the highest happiness. [30] If samsara is ruled by ignorance, nirvana is the home of perfect wisdom. Nagao explains the equation between wisdom and nirvana; through wisdom nirvana is met. [31] The limits of language make it difficult to explain nirvana because it is unexplainable. To reduce nirvana to linguistic formulations objectifies it, yet, it is not an object but an extraordinary experience. Language places limits, yet, nirvana is unlimitable. Thus, in a sense, language puts an end to nirvana's existence. In silence alone nirvana is. Nagao says that the Two-fold Truth opens a channel in which "Language recovers itself in spite of its falsehood and ignorance". As the 'silence' of nirvana is true wisdom (prajna), logic which was recovered and moulded in the form of language, represents the 'great Compassion' (maha-karuna) of the Buddha toward the illusory world. Logic and language are the means by which suffering humans in the samsaric world are taught that there is a way out of their situation. [32] The compassion of the Buddha is so great that he provides a means of explaining the unexplainable in order to draw others towards nirvana. Thus, his message of salvation's way can be transmitted to all who are reached through the Bodhisattva's missionary zeal. The doctrine of the Two-fold Truth allows us to speak the unspeakable for purposes of explaining the difference between samsara and nirvana.
Wisdom, Meditation and Compassion uiring great wisdom one advances to nirvana or enlightenment. Although wisdom and nirvana are not the same we cannot have one without the other. When we speak of 'wisdom' we are not speaking of ordinary wisdom but that which transcends the mundane to a profound understanding of the true nature of Being as arising from the ground of universal primordial suffering. Meditation is the vehicle of this profound insight. It brings one to the necessary conclusion that one must become detached from the cravings and desires of this world if one is to be free of the suffering originating in our primordial nature. In meditation one enters the realm of the non-self and, thus, one becomes purified of the self-centred defilements of this world. Our cravings and desires to which we have clung are of no importance any longer. In wisdom we understand m a most profound way that these defilements are the ground of all human suffering. It is how we perceive the world that makes the difference. Meditation of the profound nature recommended in Mahayana Buddhism is the vehicle for changing our perspective.
Achievement of the nirvanic state is primarily a mental process. Although we may be completely unaware of our physical bodies when in nirvana, we are not (strictly speaking) physically transported beyond the samsaric word.
Thus, a samsaric state of mind and nirvanic state of mind might be best described as two different, non-simultaneous states of consciousness in the same individual whose physical body is in the samsaric world. A scriptural passage that comes to mind to describe this state of being is, 'He (Jesus) was in this world but not of it'. The enlightened live in this world beside the unenlightened. But, in wisdom they:... are free of all false imagination and attachment, for them, the world is no longer imagined and contaminated; it is pure and consummated. The world in which they live their lives differs in no way from our own. [33]
"Compassion" by Lawrence Blum
Discussions about compassion are dispersed in Western philosophical discourse and focused primarily under the categories of moral theory, emotions or theories of emotion. And, while compassion is a central notion in Mahayana Buddhism, it is more of a peripheral topic in the West. Lawrence Blum's essay on compassion provides us with an analysis of this emotion that will be the basis of the discussion about to be undertaken. His remarks are taken as representative, although not exclusively, of an analytic perspective in Western philosophy.
Blum complains that emotions, and compassion in particular, have received insufficient attention in philosophy. It is his belief that compassion is 'central to morality'. [34] The goal of his essay is 'to bring out compassion's particular moral value, as well as some of its limitations'. From the beginning of his discussion it is evident that Blum engages in the prevailing Western philosophical tradition of dichotomous thinking. For example, he claims that compassion is an object-orientated emotion. This subject-object dichotomy creates a distance between those needing compassion and those offering it that is virtually unbridgeable. In the end this distance is maintained in such a way that it is clear that Blum does not have in mind a discussion of compassion of the depth found in Mahayana Buddhism. His analysis never arrives at a discussion of the universal nature of suffering as a primordial condition of human existence. He tends to deal mostly in surfaces such as the observation of adverse conditions in a person's life which arouse compassion in the observer. For this reason, his analysis is regarded as superficial although, perhaps, not in the most usual understanding of this word. That is, his remarks are not totally without depth such as when he speaks of the psychology of a 'creative imagination' that allows the observer to put himself in the place of victim for whom compassion is felt.
The notion of distancing oneself from the object of our compassion comes through strongly in Blum in a number of ways. For example, he says 'compassion does not require that its subject have experienced the sort of suffering that occasions it'. [35] He says that we can feel compassion for someone who has lost a child even though we may be childless. This is true, of course. But, such a statement reveals how very different Blum's focus is than the Mahayana Buddhist. In Mahayana it is not so much the loss of the-child that is the cause of suffering as it is our clinging to the child whom we desire to be still alive and our clinging to memories of the child. We suffer because we cling. This interpretation provides a depth of focus that is not found in Blum. According to Mahayana thought, Blum is expressing the faulty view that we feel compassion for another because of a particular circumstance in his life rather than having the understanding that the suffering the parent experiences over the loss of a child is symptomatic of a deeper problem that is universal and primordial in nature.
Since his view is on the particular it allows the observer to sustain a distance from the object of compassion because he (the observer) does not always share in the object's experience. Blum says that compassion may be "part of a complex attitude (of a subject) towards its object". By this, he means that one may feel compassion for another because of something in that person's life which brings out this feeling. Yet, his focus remains upon the symptoms, i.e. death, hunger, and the like, rather than upon the deeper primordial disorder. In fact, his analysis takes us further away from compassionate identification since there are those we can observe as having nothing in common with us. Such dislocation of self-identification with others risks taking us further away from compassionate identification which motivates us to act in behalf of others.
One observes in Blum an almost continual distance between subject and object, the observer and observed, It is as if the latter suffers but the former does not. This attitude is apparent when Blum discusses the origin of the word compassion as involving a 'feeling with' another person. He says:
In one sense this means that the subject and the object have the same feeling-type: distress, sorrow,... But in a more important sense the feelings are not the same: for the relation between their subjects and their objects are different. The focus of my neighbor's distress is his own homelessness; the focus of my distress in having compassion for him is my neighbor's homelessness. [36]
Here Blum points out that differences between the subject and object are more important than any shared experience. He continues by saying that when I suffer with my neighbour it is not the same as his suffering, I suffer less than he. Suffering is a matter of degree. This idea is troublesome in this comparison of views because on the Eastern perspective compassion is not discussed as a matter of degree. The fact that a Bodhisattva volunteers to give up entering nirvana until all are saved strongly suggests that he has suffered at least equally; his first hand knowledge of suffering is one of the main motivating forces for his compassionate behaviour. The fact that he has known the same suffering as his fellow human beings forms a bond of unity between he and them. In Mahayana this bond is expressed as
gotra or family in what is regarded here in the purest sense of the word; one with others.
Another way that Blum distances us from identification with others is by introducing analysis that serves to distract us from a discussion about compassion. He claims that one may also have other feelings towards a person which may or may not over-ride compassion. For example, one may feel compassion for the blind person because of his blindness but feel over-riding admiration for this person because he has become the successful president of his own business. Blum's point is that sometimes we must sort out our feelings of compassion from other feelings to determine which is more appropriate. In a sense, he is recommending that we reason through our compassion to another emotion. Such an idea moves us further from any core notions about the universality of suffering and compartm
